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ABSTRACT 
 
This article recovers the plight of legal education during the Great 
Depression, showing how debates over practical training, theoretical 
research and the appropriate length of law school all emerged in the 
1930s.  Using Bramble Bush author Karl Llewellyn as a guide, it strives to 
make three points.  One, Depression-era critics of law school called for 
increased attention to practical skills, like today, but also a more inter-
disciplinary curriculum – something current reformers discount.  Two, the 
push for theoretical, policy-oriented courses in the 1930s set the stage for 
claims that law graduates deserved more than a Bachelor of Laws degree, 
bolstering the move away from a two year LL.B. and towards a mandatory 
three year Juris Doctor, or J.D..  The rise of the J.D. following World War 
II, this article concludes, heightened the role of inter-disciplinary work in 
the first three years, even as it substantially diminished the role of 
advanced, graduate-level research, a point worth recalling as law school 
reformers, the ABA and, even the President of the United States lobby for 
shorter, more-practice oriented programs.  While such proposals may be 
prudent, they may also warrant a return to plural law degrees.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
 Nihil sub sole novum.
1
  Early in the fall semester of 1929, 
Columbia Law Professor Karl Llewellyn delivered a series of lectures “to 
introduce the students of Columbia Law School to the study of law,” 
including the “case method.”2  Adopting a lively, spirited tone, Llewellyn 
likened the case method to the fabled bramble bush, a barbed plant into 
which “a man … wondrous and wise,” jumped only to scratch out his eyes 
and, after some amount of suffering, return to scratch “them in again.”3  
Rigorous but rewarding, legal education was well worth it.  “[A]s the tonic 
iodine burns in the wounds and beneath the skin,” rhapsodized LLewellyn, 
“the [student’s] whole body tingles with that curious bubbling sense of 
muscle pleasure,” a sense that “for too much law, more law will be the 
cure.”4 
 Five years later, in the winter of 1935, the 43 year old law 
professor strummed a darker chord.  American law schools were a “sham” 
declared Llewellyn to an audience at Harvard in the midst of the nation’s 
worst economic crisis in history.
5
  Rather than train students for the job 
market, law schools took their students’ “coin” and, in return, offered little 
more than a “pretense of training for the law.”6  While legal education had 
invigorated him only five years before, now it sickened him; law schools 
were mere “conveyor belts,” industrial facilities aimed at “mass-
production.”7 
 Then – suddenly – happy days returned.  By 1956, midst an 
economic boom that lasted over a decade, Llewellyn cast himself joyously 
back into the bramble bush, extolling legal education and legal 
scholarship.  “Look about you,” implored Llewellyn of a group of law 
professors at a conference in Michigan, “[o]ne out of three, before this 
academic year is out, will not only be doing legal research – every man of 
law has been doing that all his life – one of you three will be doing or 
                                                 
1
 “There is nothing new under the sun.”  Ecclesiastes , 1:9, NEW OXFORD ANNOTATED 
BIBLE: REVISED STANDARD VERSION  805 (1973). 
2
 KARL LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH vii, 19 (Oceana, 1996) (1930).  
3
 KARL LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH 141 (Oceana, 1996) (1930). 
4
 KARL LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH 141 (Oceana, 1996) (1930). 
5
 Karl N. Llewellyn, On What Is Wrong with So-Called Legal Education, 35 COLUMBIA 
LAW REVIEW 651 (1935) reprinted in THE HISTORY OF LEGAL EDUCATION IN THE 
UNITED STATES: COMMENTARIES AND PRIMARY SOURCES, VOL. I, 705 (Steve Sheppard, 
ed., Salem Press, 1999). 
6
 Karl N. Llewellyn, On What Is Wrong with So-Called Legal Education, 35 COLUMBIA 
LAW REVIEW 651 (1935) reprinted in THE HISTORY OF LEGAL EDUCATION IN THE 
UNITED STATES: COMMENTARIES AND PRIMARY SOURCES, VOL. I, 705 (Steve Sheppard, 
ed., Salem Press, 1999). 
7
 Karl N. Llewellyn, On What Is Wrong with So-Called Legal Education, 35 COLUMBIA 
LAW REVIEW 651 (1935). 
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contributing to a bit of significant legal research.”8  This, argued 
Llewellyn, was “something new in this America,” particularly since he 
could “remember when legal research other than into doctrine – except 
perhaps in the fields of history, crime and divorce – seemed, if not 
disreputable, at best queer.”9  Now, argued Llewellyn, the field was ripe 
for inter-disciplinary work, conducted by the “double or treble discipline 
law teacher,” capable of “cut[ing] moats across the path of the social 
scientist who seeks to work in that disregarded, even almost disreputable 
discipline, the law.”10 
 Law’s long struggle to gain academic respectability remains one of 
the most over-looked aspects of the history of legal education, even 
though it helps explain the prominence of theoretical research in law 
schools today.
11
  During the 1920s, for example, law professors at elite 
schools promoted theoretical scholarship in a deliberate bid to improve the 
intellectual integrity of legal education generally.  This continued during 
the Great Depression, even as many blamed law schools for poorly 
preparing students, a move that – like today – yielded calls for reform.12  
However, proposals for reform in the 1930s differed from current 
suggestions in that they argued not simply for more apprenticeship-style 
programs – a popular current corrective – but also for more inter-
disciplinary offerings, an “integration of the human and the artistic with 
the legal.”13 While most critics today argue that law schools spend too 
much time on such pursuits, even outspoken critics of legal education in 
the 1930s did not.
14
   
 Law teachers in the 1930s remembered all too well the battles that 
law schools fought to earn academic parity with other university 
departments during the early Progressive era, an ordeal that lasted from 
the 1890s through the 1920s.
15
  Christopher Columbus Langdell pioneered 
this project, in part by hiring non-practitioner teachers, declaring law a 
science, and promoting the case method.
16
  Scholars like Karl Llewellyn 
                                                 
8
 Karl N. Llewellyn, On What Makes Legal Research Worth While, 8 J. LEGAL EDUC. 400 
(1956).  
9
 Karl N. Llewellyn, On What Makes Legal Research Worth While, 8 J. LEGAL EDUC. 400 
(1956). 
10
 Karl N. Llewellyn, On What Makes Legal Research Worth While, 8 J. LEGAL EDUC. 
400 (1956). 
11
 BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, FAILING LAW SCHOOLS ix - xiii (2012).  A. Benjamin Spencer, 
The Law School Critique in Historical Perspective, 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1951 
(2012).  
12
 Karl N. Llewellyn, On What Is Wrong with So-Called Legal Education, 35 COLUMBIA 
LAW REVIEW 651 (1935). 
13
 Karl N. Llewellyn, On What Is Wrong with So-Called Legal Education, 35 COLUMBIA 
LAW REVIEW 651 (1935). 
14
 BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, FAILING LAW SCHOOLS 54-61 (2012); David Segal, What They 
Don’t Teach Law Students: Lawyering, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 19, 2011. 
15
 ROBERT STEVENS, LAW SCHOOLS: LEGAL EDUCATION IN AMERICA FROM THE 1850S TO 
THE 1980S 115, 159 (1983).  
16
 A. Benjamin Spencer, The Law School Critique in Historical Perspective, 69 WASH. & 
LEE L. REV. 1959 (2012); ROBERT STEVENS, LAW SCHOOLS: LEGAL EDUCATION IN 
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continued it, arguing that “the background of social and economic fact and 
policy” should be integrated with case materials lest law professors “fail 
of our job.”17  Meanwhile, law schools worked steadfastly to acquire the 
same degree-granting privileges that other university divisions enjoyed, a 
battle that became particularly intense over the question of the doctorate in 
law, or JD.
18
  As law schools lobbied to grant doctorates, they found it 
necessary to overcome their trade school reputation by deliberately 
making their programs more research oriented.
19
  This struggle coincided 
closely with a lengthening of the law school curriculum from two to three 
and, in some cases, even four and five years.
20
  
Taking Karl Llewellyn’s meditations on legal education as a lens, 
this Article posits that the Depression-era law school crisis informs current 
debates about the direction of legal education, in particular calls that law 
schools should discourage theoretical scholarship in order to dedicate 
more time to practical skills.  While moving legal education in a more 
practical direction may have its advantages, stripping the J.D. of its 
academic garb may not.  Already, the Juris Doctor demands a lighter 
research requirement than the PhD; de-robing it further may only rekindle 
old critiques that law schools lack academic rigor and, ultimately, 
legitimacy.  Instead, reformers may be better off considering the benefits 
of conferring plural law degrees – much as schools did in the past – 
conferring Master’s degrees for less than three years of study, J.D.’s for 
three, and S.J.D.’s, or research doctorates, for more. 
To elaborate, this Article proceeds in four parts.  Part II recovers 
the political history behind Langdell’s initial decision to elevate law 
teaching beyond the trade school model, tying it first to the rise of the 
Bachelor’s and then the Master’s degrees in law.  Part III demonstrates 
how the Bachelor’s of law degree grew from a two to a mandatory three 
year program as law schools struggled to improve their academic profiles 
within larger university systems.  Part IV shows how the Great Depression 
complicated this effort, pushing many to question the length and value of 
legal education as law firm hiring declined.  Finally, Part V illustrates how 
reforms wrought during the Depression introduced more theoretical work 
into the first three years, reduced interest in optional graduate work, and 
                                                                                                                                                 
AMERICA FROM THE 1850S TO THE 1980S, 52-55 (1983); See also WILLIAM LAPIANA, 
LOGIC AND EXPERIENCE: THE ORIGINS OF MODERN AMERICAN LEGAL EDUCATION 
(1994).  
17
 Karl N. Llewellyn, On What Is Wrong with So-Called Legal Education, 35 COLUMBIA 
LAW REVIEW 671 (1935). 
18
 JULIUS GOEBEL, JR., A HISTORY OF THE SCHOOL OF LAW: COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY, 292-
297 (1955).   
19
 See infra Part III.  
20
 Some law schools, like Columbia, even added a fourth year to the standard three-year 
bachelor of law program for those who wanted to doctorate.  JULIUS GOEBEL, JR., A 
HISTORY OF THE SCHOOL OF LAW: COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY 333 (1955).  Columbia Law 
School did not receive permission from its Board of Trustees to issue a doctorate in law, 
or J.D., until 1923, and only then after a considerable fight. JULIUS GOEBEL, JR., A 
HISTORY OF THE SCHOOL OF LAW: COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY 108 (1955).   
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set the stage for conferral of the Juris Doctor, or J.D. on all law school 
graduates.
21
 
While the history of legal education is nothing new, relatively little 
attention has been paid to the precise manner in which curricular reform 
intersected with the conferral of law school degrees.
22
  Yet, the move to a 
single degree did much to eliminate variation among schools, pushing all 
schools toward a three year template that stressed an “academic” 
approach.
23
  For schools that either possessed or aspired to build a 
research reputation, this may have been a good thing, even if it 
undermined support for advanced independent research.  However, for 
schools that did not aspire to be part of a larger research university, the 
push for a Juris Doctor may have been a mistake.
24
 
 
II. THE CASE METHOD AS PRACTICAL SKILLS 
 
Prior to the Civil War, legal education in America focused on the 
law office.
25
  Aspiring attorneys worked as apprentices to experienced 
practitioners, free from classroom instruction or formal academic 
supervision.
26
  Though a few isolated law schools existed, universities 
generally struggled to mount viable law programs.
27
  Princeton, George 
Washington, New York University and Alabama all founded law schools 
during the antebellum period only to promptly see them close for lack of 
enrollment.
28
 
                                                 
21
 See infra Part V.  
22
 While historians show that “prominent legal educators” lobbied for a two year 
curriculum in the 1970s, few note the tension between this move and the even larger 
“J.D. movement” sponsored by lower ranked schools hungry for heightened prestige.  
Compare BRIAN TAMANAHA, FAILING LAW SCHOOLS 20 (2012) [and] ROBERT STEVENS, 
LAW SCHOOL: LEGAL EDUCATION IN AMERICA FROM THE 1850S TO THE 1980S 242 (1983) 
with John G. Hervey, Law School Graduates Should Receive “Professional Doctorates” 
… Time for a Change from LL.B. to J.D. Degree, 10 STUDENT LAW. J. 6 (1965) [and] 
George P. Smith, II, Much Ado About Nothing – the J.D. Movement, 11 STUDENT LAW. J. 
8-9 (1965).  
23
 BRIAN TAMANAHA, FAILING LAW SCHOOLS 23 (2012). The push for a singular law 
degree, it is important to note, was not the only factor that inhibited variation.  As early as 
the 1920s, both the AALS and the ABA endorsed accreditation standards that promoted a 
singular, “academic model” of legal education.  See BRIAN TAMANAHA, FAILING LAW 
SCHOOLS 24-6 (2012).  
24
 BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, FAILING LAW SCHOOLS 54-61 (2012).  
25
 A. Benjamin Spencer, The Law School Critique in Historical Perspective 69 WASH. & 
LEE L. REV. 1970 (2012); ROBERT STEVENS, LAW SCHOOL: LEGAL EDUCATION IN 
AMERICA FROM THE 1850S TO THE 1980S 8 (1983). 
26
 ROBERT STEVENS, LAW SCHOOL: LEGAL EDUCATION IN AMERICA FROM THE 1850S TO 
THE 1980S 8 (1983). 
27
 David S. Clark, Tracing the Roots of American Legal Education: A Nineteenth-Century 
German Connection, in THE HISTORY OF LEGAL EDUCATION IN THE UNITED STATES 497 
(Steve Sheppard ed., 1999); ROBERT STEVENS, LAW SCHOOL: LEGAL EDUCATION IN 
AMERICA FROM THE 1850S TO THE 1980S 17 n50 (1983). 
28
 ROBERT STEVENS, LAW SCHOOL: LEGAL EDUCATION IN AMERICA FROM THE 1850S TO 
THE 1980S 8 (1983). 
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Following the Civil War, claims that apprenticeships lacked rigor 
began to coalesce, particularly as the economy industrialized and legal 
markets grew.
29
  Top lawyers formed bar organizations, sponsored 
“systematic bar examinations,” and called for “more rigorous training” of 
new attorneys.
30
  Some complained that law office apprenticeships proved 
erratic, leading to the vetting of lawyers who had little general knowledge 
but were trained simply to perform rote tasks.
31
 Others complained that the 
law office model lent itself to political corruption, placing political acuity 
above legal acumen.
32
  
One such critic was Christopher Columbus Langdell, a practicing 
attorney in New York who had worked his way through Harvard Law 
School as a librarian; taking three years rather than the customary one and 
a half.
33
  Upon graduation, Langdell entered private practice in New York, 
spending much of his time in the New York Law Institute’s library, one of 
the few libraries open to attorneys at the time.
34
  Already trained as a 
librarian, Langdell quickly developed a reputation for being one of the 
best-read lawyers in the city, a person who other attorneys in Manhattan 
came to consult.
35
  One such lawyer, William Stanley, learned so much 
from Langdell that he offered him a partnership in his firm, literally 
moving him – physically – into the firm’s office space.  “A narrow 
winding staircase,” recalled James Barr Ames, “led from the office of 
[Stanley’s] firm to a room above, which was [Langdell’s] private office, 
and adjoining it was his bedroom.”36   
Langdell’s installation in Stanley’s office led many to suspect that 
the young attorney prized books over clients, developing an aversion to 
practice that would later color his approach to legal education.
37
  For 
example, many attributed Langdell’s eventual development of the case 
method to his failings as an attorney.
38
  Precisely because he spent most of 
                                                 
29
 ROBERT STEVENS, LAW SCHOOL: LEGAL EDUCATION IN AMERICA FROM THE 1850S TO 
THE 1980S 24 (1983). 
30
 ROBERT STEVENS, LAW SCHOOL: LEGAL EDUCATION IN AMERICA FROM THE 1850S TO 
THE 1980S 24, 25, 27 (1983). 
31
 ROBERT STEVENS, LAW SCHOOL: LEGAL EDUCATION IN AMERICA FROM THE 1850S TO 
THE 1980S 22 (1983). 
32
 Bruce A. Kimball & R. Blake Brown, The Highest Legal Ability in the Nation”: 
Langdell on Wall Street, 1855-1870 29 LAW & SOCIAL INQUIRY 46 (2004). 
33
 JAMES BARR AMES, LECTURES ON LEGAL HISTORY AND MISCELLANEOUS LEGAL 
ESSAYS 470 (1913). 
34
 JAMES BARR AMES, LECTURES ON LEGAL HISTORY AND MISCELLANEOUS LEGAL 
ESSAYS 471 (1913). 
35
 JAMES BARR AMES, LECTURES ON LEGAL HISTORY AND MISCELLANEOUS LEGAL 
ESSAYS 471-2 (1913). 
36
 JAMES BARR AMES, LECTURES ON LEGAL HISTORY AND MISCELLANEOUS LEGAL 
ESSAYS 479 (1913). 472.  
37
 Allen Boyer, Review of Logic and Experience, by William LaPiana 80 CORNELL L. 
REV. 362 (1995); W. Burlette Carter, Reconstructing Langdell 32 GEORGIA L. REV. 67 
(1997); Steve Sheppard, An Introductory history of Law in the Lecture Hall, in THE 
HISTORY OF LEGAL EDUCATION IN THE UNITED STATES 25 (Steve Sheppard ed., 1999).  
38
 Id.  
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his time in the library, they argued, Langdell manufactured the idea that 
law was a “science” consisting of “certain principles or doctrines,” each of 
which have evolved, over time, in “slow degrees,” and “[t]his growth was 
to be traced in the main through a series of cases.”39  Practitioners, even 
scholars, came to view this method as the product of a lawyer “unready for 
the courtroom,” a “sensitive spectacled student” someone who remained 
“unduly trusting in knowledge from books,” precisely because he could 
not hold his own against seasoned New York City attorneys.
40
   
Yet, historian Bruce Kimball argues convincingly that even as 
Langdell mined the library, so too did he became deeply involved in 
practice, serving as lead or co-counsel in at least fifteen “prominent” cases 
between 1855 and 1870, meanwhile joining “the vanguard of those 
pioneering a new role in litigation” by focusing more heavily on 
“extensive” brief writing than “oral argument.”41  Thanks to his success, 
Langdell gained clients like the Erie Railroad, became known for 
possessing “the highest legal ability,” and argued cases with “increasing 
frequency” during his time in New York.42  In fact, Langdell’s success as 
a practicing attorney – not his naiveté – led him to become estranged from 
the practicing bar precisely because he approached legal work in a formal, 
assiduous manner; a tack that most office-trained attorneys in New York 
found alien.
43
   
The more Langdell succeeded as a practitioner, the more he 
became convinced that law-office apprenticeships fell short, leading to 
widespread “ignorance” and “incompetence” within the bar.44  In New 
York, such incompetence enjoyed the aid of an 1846 law making all state 
judges elected, placing much of the city’s judiciary directly under the 
control of Tammany Hall’s William “Boss” Tweed, who handed out 
judgeships as a form of political patronage, often to supporters who had 
little if any legal training.
45
  Meanwhile, New York abolished “demanding 
examinations” for aspiring attorneys that same year; lowering the 
“standards of expertise” required to begin practice.46   
                                                 
39
 CHRISTOPHER C. LANGDELL, SELECTION OF CASES ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS viii (2d 
ed. 1879).  
40
 Bruce A. Kimball, “The Highest Legal Ability in the Nation”: Langdell on Wall Street, 
1855-1870 29 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 40-41 (2004). 
41
 Bruce A. Kimball, “The Highest Legal Ability in the Nation”: Langdell on Wall Street, 
1855-1870 29 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 41, 44 (2004).  See also William P. LaPiana, Just the 
Facts: The Field Code and the Case Method 36 N. Y. L. SCH. L. REV. 287 (1991).  
42
 Bruce A. Kimball, “The Highest Legal Ability in the Nation”: Langdell on Wall Street, 
1855-1870 29 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 44 (2004).  
43
 Bruce A. Kimball, “The Highest Legal Ability in the Nation”: Langdell on Wall Street, 
1855-1870 29 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 44 (2004).  
44
 Bruce A. Kimball, “The Highest Legal Ability in the Nation”: Langdell on Wall Street, 
1855-1870 29 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 39, 40, 46 (2004).  
45
 Bruce A. Kimball, “The Highest Legal Ability in the Nation”: Langdell on Wall Street, 
1855-1870 29 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 39, 46 (2004). 
46
 Bruce A. Kimball, “The Highest Legal Ability in the Nation”: Langdell on Wall Street, 
1855-1870 29 LAW & SOCIAL INQUIRY 46 (2004).  
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 Langdell further soured on the state of legal education in 1869, 
when he personally represented the Northern Railroad Company in a case 
against the state of New York, who prematurely declared the company 
insolvent.
47
  Well-versed in the newly enacted Field Code of civil 
procedure, Langdell witnessed a partisan judge deride his carefully crafted 
legal brief as a “sham” and “irrelevant.”48 Though Langdell was ultimately 
vindicated on appeal; such experiences contributed to a general 
disillusionment on his part with the state of legal practice and, by 
extension, legal education in America.
49
 
Angered at the ineptitude of judges and practicing attorneys, 
Langdell proposed a radical reform of legal education in 1870, shortly 
after Harvard President Charles Eliot tapped him to head Harvard Law 
School.
50
  Once there, Langdell devised a pedagogical method focused 
solely on the study of cases, independent of either law office work or more 
traditional pedagogical models, like lecture.
51
  To illustrate, Langdell 
organized a course on Contracts that required students to read “all the 
cases which had contributed in any important degree to the growth, 
development, or establishment of any of [Contract’s] essential 
doctrines.”52  Conceding that this included “an exceedingly small 
proportion” of all the “reported” cases, Langdell nevertheless assembled a 
sizable compendium.
53
  For the section of the course dedicated to the topic 
of consideration, Langdell assigned no less than one hundred twenty-six 
cases, most from England.
54
   
Compared to other available texts at the time, Langdell’s casebook 
differed dramatically in that it cast students into a sea of opinions without 
any editorial comments or notes.  For example, Langdell’s own teacher at 
Harvard, Theophilus Parsons, “relegated all discussion of cases to notes” 
in his Contracts textbook.
55
 Likewise, treatises popular with office-trained 
attorneys like Blackstone’s Commentaries on the Laws of England 
                                                 
47
 Bruce A. Kimball, “The Highest Legal Ability in the Nation”: Langdell on Wall Street, 
1855-1870 29 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 89 (2004). 
48
 Bruce A. Kimball, “The Highest Legal Ability in the Nation”: Langdell on Wall Street, 
1855-1870 29 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 89-90 (2004). 
49
  Bruce A. Kimball, “The Highest Legal Ability in the Nation”: Langdell on Wall Street, 
1855-1870 29 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 89-90 (2004). 
50
 ROBERT STEVENS, LAW SCHOOL: LEGAL EDUCATION IN AMERICA FROM THE 1850S TO 
THE 1980S 35 (1983); Bruce A. Kimball, “The Highest Legal Ability in the Nation”: 
Langdell on Wall Street, 1855-1870 29 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 90 (2004). 
51
 ROBERT STEVENS, LAW SCHOOL: LEGAL EDUCATION IN AMERICA FROM THE 1850S TO 
THE 1980S 35 (1983). 
52
 Christopher Columbus Langdell, Preface to the First Edition, Oct. 1, 1871 in C.C. 
LANGDELL, SELECTION OF  CASES ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS ix (2
nd
 ed., 1879).  
53
 Christopher Columbus Langdell, Preface to the First Edition, Oct. 1, 1871 in C.C. 
LANGDELL, SELECTION OF  CASES ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS vii (2
nd
 ed., 1879). 
54
 C.C. LANGDELL, SELECTION OF CASES ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 164-441 (2
nd
 ed., 
1879). 
55
 William P. LaPiana, Just the Facts: The Field Code and the Case Method, 36 N.Y.L. 
SCH. L. REV. 287, 326 (1991).  
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provided students with a general overview of the law, sparing them the 
trouble of actually reading judicial opinions.
56
 
Bold in its departure from tradition; Langdell’s pedagogical 
“innovation” sparked initial “hostility.”57  According to Langdell’s protégé 
James Barr Ames, “[h]ardly one” of the lawyers in Boston at the time “had 
any faith in it,” nor did most students seem to like it.58  After his first 
lecture based on the case method, Langdell’s class enrollment “dwindled 
to a handful of students.”59  Many walked out of the room.60  Others chose 
not to enroll, leading to a precipitous drop in Harvard’s class size.61 
  Langdell persisted. To bolster his new method, he encouraged the 
hiring of law professors who had little, if any, legal experience.   “What 
qualifies a person … to teach law,” argued Langdell, “is not experience in 
the work of a lawyer’s office, not experience in dealing with men, not 
experience in the trial or argument of causes, not experience, in short, in 
using law, but experience in learning law.”62  Langdell’s casebook 
explained why.  He assigned his students one hundred twenty six cases on 
the substantive topic of consideration at a time when most attorneys 
focused less on substantive topics than procedure, particularly forms of 
pleading.
63
  As historian William LaPiana notes, leading lawyers “lauded 
the ‘science’ of pleading,” more than they did a command of substantive 
topics since forms of pleading tended to determine case outcomes.
64
  Law 
teachers followed, publishing treatises on pleading that became more 
popular than treatises on doctrinal subjects.
65
  According to law professor 
James Gould, pleading comprised “the most important single title in the 
law” in part because all questions of common law depended on whether 
they were accurately pled.
66
 
                                                 
56
 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND (1758).  
57
 JAMES BARR AMES, LECTURES ON LEGAL HISTORY AND MISCELLANEOUS LEGAL 
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ESSAYS 479 (1913). 
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 Yet, pleading changed dramatically in 1848, when the state of New 
York adopted a new Code of Procedure named after David Dudley Field.
67
  
Enacted as part of a larger effort to simplify the state’s judicial system, the 
Field Code did away with separate courts of law and equity, establishing a 
unified “court of appeals.”68  Field had long argued for such a court, 
claiming that complex disputes should be brought in one forum and 
“settled in one action,” with pleadings that “told as simply as possible 
what happened,” not pleadings that adhered to complex, predetermined 
forms.
69
  For the practicing lawyer, this meant that attorneys did not 
simply need to know “the rules of pleading,” but also “the legal 
principles” underlying their claims.70  This, in turn, encouraged a renewed 
attention to cases.  “Under the [Field] Code,” argues LaPiana, “the careful 
lawyer had to concentrate on a close reading of earlier cases to find a 
narrower sort of precedent – one in which the facts resembled the case at 
hand.”71   
 For Langdell, the Field Code coincided nicely with his new 
approach to legal education, one focused less on pleadings and more on 
cases. The more students engaged in “the careful searching of past cases 
for particular circumstances,” he believed, the better they would be at 
providing “analogies” for use in Field Code pleadings.72  Langdell’s own 
career demonstrated the logic of such an approach.  While other lawyers 
exploited political connections and mastered procedural forms, Langdell 
built his reputation on reading cases, eventually developing an 
encyclopedic knowledge of New York law that garnered him a regional 
reputation.   
Precisely because private study bolstered his career, Langdell came 
to believe that those best equipped to instruct students were those who 
excelled at case work in school, not necessarily those who succeeded in 
practice.  This may have stemmed from his own experience. Long before 
Langdell entered the practicing bar, he worked as a research assistant to 
Harvard Law professor Theophilus Parsons who pushed him and his 
fellow assistants to digest over six thousand cases for his treatise on 
contracts.
73
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This point warrants some comment.  Prior to Langdell, law 
students could be successful without learning much about cases, absorbing 
most of their information through general lecture.
74
  At Columbia 
University, for example, law professor James Kent noted that the school 
dedicated a mere four lectures to the entire subject of Contracts in its first 
year curriculum, leaving students with little sense of where the principles 
of contract derived, or how they applied in specific circumstances.
75
  
Lawyers trained in law offices arguably knew even less.  Even those who 
augmented their practical training with independent study; like 
Blackstone’s Commentaries on the Laws of England, ended up knowing 
next to nothing about judicial opinions; how they were crafted, what legal 
principles they held, or how they might be synthesized.
76
  For example, 
Blackstone dedicated one chapter in his four volume treatise to the subject 
of Contracts, presenting little more than a general overview of contract 
doctrine.
77
  To make matters worse, no headnote system existed, most 
cases were not reported, and judges in cities like New York tended to rule 
based on their professional connections and political leanings.
78
  For this 
very reason, Langdell actually became convinced that practitioners 
threatened to inculcate the wrong values in students, instilling “the arts of 
chicane and self-promotion,” not doctrinal expertise or logical 
consistency.
79
 
Suspicious of the notion that practice made for sound pedagogy, 
Langdell revolutionized law school teaching, a point historians have long 
recognized.  Yet, as the next section shall demonstrate, Langdell’s reforms 
intersected in subtle ways with a larger law school interest in being 
considered equal, academic partners in university systems.  Critical to this 
move was an effort to boost admissions criteria, curricular content, and 
law school length.  
 
III. A SECOND BACHELOR’S IN 3 YEARS 
 
As Langdell reformed legal pedagogy, law schools worked 
diligently to make entrance into their programs more competitive.  In 
1876, Columbia became the first law school to require an entrance exam, 
though it only applied to applicants who had not graduated from a “literary 
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college.”80 College graduates were “admitted without examination” under 
the theory that they had already proven their academic merit.
81
  Non-
graduates, on the other hand, had to pass an entrance exam on “Greek and 
Roman History,” the “History of England and of the United States (of 
North America), English Grammar, Rhetoric,” and finally “the principles 
of composition” as used “in Caesar’s Gallic War (entire), six books of 
Virgil’s Aeneid,” and “six orations of Cicero.”82 
At the time, Columbia required only two years of study, a span that 
Professor John W. Burgess attacked as insufficient in 1881.
83
  Burgess 
proposed a three year program before students could qualify for a 
“Bachelor of Laws” degree.84  A majority of the faculty disagreed, arguing 
that students should gain a Bachelor after two years, with the option of 
continuing on for a third year to earn a “Master of Laws” degree.85  
Columbia University President Frederick Barnard balked at such a move, 
declaring the mere notion that a student who had not attended college 
might gain entrance to Columbia Law School and receive a master’s 
degree within three years to be a “farce.”86  Instead, Barnard proposed that 
only students who boasted both a Bachelor of Laws and a Bachelor of Arts 
degree should be admitted into the optional, third year Master’s program.87  
One advantage of such a program, argued Barnard, was that it “would 
bring in additional revenue without incurring additional expenses.”88  
Another advantage was that it would better position Columbia vis a vis 
Harvard and Yale, both of whom adopted an optional third year for those 
interested in a Master’s degree in the 1880s.89  Despite initial reluctance, 
the Board of Trustees finally approved a mandatory third year for all 
students interested in pursuing a Bachelor of Laws degree in 1888, making 
Columbia the first law school not only to implement an admissions exam 
but also to require a mandatory, three year course of study.
90
  
This warrants some comment.  Rather than respond to a clear and 
compelling need, say a demand for a year of supervised clinical work akin 
to medical school residencies, the mandatory third year at Columbia 
focused more specifically on deepening students’ understanding of 
doctrinal subjects.  As Professor Dwight put it in 1890, “[t]he theory” 
behind the third year was the assumption that a student in going through 
the two years course has obtained a good general outline of the law, and is 
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now prepared to take up special subjects in detail.”91  Such subjects, 
continued Dwight, included topics of “intrinsic importance,” matters 
frequently used “in the affairs of life,” and areas of unusual difficulty; 
including corporations, Federal Jurisprudence, and Constitutional Law.
92
   
Not all agreed with the merits of such an approach.  Some argued 
that charging one more year’s tuition discriminated against less affluent 
students, reserving law school to the sons of wealthy families.”93  Others 
complained that the move to three years aimed to shift the emphasis of the 
school away from practical training and towards more theoretical 
concerns.
94
 As one student put it, the third year amounted to little more 
than “padding out the course with ‘political science,’” an oblique 
reference to an effort by University President Seth Low to integrate 
programming and build bridges between departments, all part of raising 
Columbia College to the status of a university.
95
  Among Low’s directives 
was a requirement that all applicants to law school first complete “three 
years of college,” and that the second year of law school be dedicated to 
more explicitly academic concerns, including forty lectures in political 
science.
96
 
That the law school suffered pressure from the university to focus 
on theoretical, inter-disciplinary courses is worth noting.  Though training 
attorneys remained a core aspect of the school’s mission, so too did the 
institution aspire to remain a respected division of the larger university; a 
place supportive of research and theoretical work.  For example, law 
professor John Burgess delivered lectures on decidedly non-skills based 
courses like comparative law, constitutional history, diplomatic history, 
and international law as early as the 1870s.
97
  At the time, Burgess hoped 
to “neutralize the intense professionalism of the Law School” by lecturing 
on public law subjects, in essence providing a counterpoint to the school’s 
exclusive focus on training attorneys.
98
  As Burgess put it, he hoped to 
elevate the academic reputation of the school “by supplementing the 
studies in Private Law,” contracts, corporations, wills, and so on, with 
“studies in Ethics, History, and Public Law,” all of which he grouped 
together as integral parts of “the science of Jurisprudence.”99  He also 
hoped to train students for positions in government, a dream that his 
successors would take up during the Great Depression.
100
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While the private law faculty tolerated Burgess, some viewed his 
theoretical courses to be better suited for advanced candidates with 
academic aspirations.  Such was the view of Professor Theodore Dwight, 
who argued that courses in public law should be reserved for an optional, 
post-graduate year of study.
101
  Specifically, Dwight argued for an elective 
third year devoted to theoretical and/or public law topics, resulting in a 
Master of Laws degree.
102
  Of course, this was before the law school 
moved to a mandatory third year.  Had the law school moved to such a 
year in 1878 rather than 1888, Burgess might have succeeded in molding 
the third year curriculum.  As it was, however, he met significant 
resistance to merging theoretical work with private law courses in the 
limited two year program that still existed in the 1870s.
103
   
Frustrated, Burgess requested and received permission to found a 
separate School of Political Science, the university’s first “nonprofessional 
graduate school” in 1880.104  As political science broke from law, it left 
the private law faculty, and the case method, ascendant.
105
  Few 
personified this transition better than William Albert Keener, a Harvard 
hire who rejected the lecture approach of men like Burgess and worked 
diligently to nudge his colleagues in the direction of the case method, 
arguing that it offered a more rigorous training than lectures and 
recitations.  Like Langdell, Keener believed that after studying a series of 
cases, students left class better trained, more conversant on the particulars 
of legal doctrine, and better able to extract general rules from a set of 
specific circumstances.  Others articulated this view as well.  For example, 
Eugene Wambaugh noted in his 1894 treatise The Study of Cases, that 
“having collected several cases bearing more or less directly upon the 
point,” students subsequently “attempt[] by combination and comparison 
to ascertain what doctrine is to be deduced from the cases taken 
together.”106  This process of “combining and comparing cases” assumed a 
quasi-scientific aspect, involving the same “methods of induction” used by 
scientists to analyze experiments, though the experiments were replaced 
by “many thousands” of cases.107  Precisely for this reason, law teachers 
who had not practiced stood an equal if not better chance of successfully 
guiding students through the study of cases, a form of pedagogy that had 
little to do with real world experience.
108
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Yet, students were not unanimously pleased.  While some 
appreciated the victory of the case method over “attorneyism,” others 
lamented the new teaching style, as Harvard students had over two 
decades before.  They also protested the extra third year.
109
  A significant 
number of students in the Class of 1892 refused to stay for the extra year, 
opting to simply take the Bar exam without graduating.
110
  A similarly 
minded cadre of faculty members defected from Columbia and formed a 
rival school, the New York Law School, dedicated to opposing the case 
method and maintaining a two year program.
111
  By 1904, New York Law 
School had become the biggest law school in the United States, even as 
Columbia saw its enrollment drop precipitously.
112
  Yet, Columbia 
persisted, led in large part by Keener’s growing conviction that the study 
of cases imparted the most practical skill of all, namely the ability to 
engage in “legal thinking and legal reasoning.”113 
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So dominant became Keener’s emphasis on reasoning that the 
more academically minded faculty conceded his method to the first three 
years, arguing that students interested in theoretical work should be 
allowed to remain on for a fourth, optional year, resulting in a Master of 
Laws degree.
114
  Granted in conjunction with the Faculty of Political 
Science, the Master of Laws required that students take additional courses 
either in the law school or the School of Political Science, including 
courses on economics, history, and public law.
115
 At the end of their year, 
applicants sat for examinations in “Comparative Constitutional Law, 
Administrative Law, Roman Law, International Law, History, Economics, 
and “Social Ethics.”116  However, no express research requirement was 
imposed.
117
   
Columbia’s decision to award a Master’s degree after four years 
was noteworthy; evidence that the school was resolving the tension 
between practical skills and research by relegating practical skills to the 
Bachelor of Laws, meanwhile elevating research to the Master’s level.  
This satisfied the predominantly private, practitioner oriented faculty by 
not watering down their curriculum, even as it maintained the law school’s 
academic profile by reserving theoretical work for advanced study.  
Finally, reserving the Master’s for those who took interdisciplinary 
courses in Political Science went far towards preserving a meaningful 
distinction between the degrees. 
Yet, some wanted the school to go even farther.  As early as 1908, 
University President Nicholas Butler proposed a doctorate in law, or 
“Doctor Juris,” to the Trustees.118  However, faculty in Political Science 
and Philosophy balked at such a move, afraid that it would cheapen the 
university’s Doctor of Philosophy, or PhD.119  To accommodate such 
concerns, the law school agreed to a “compromise scheme” by which “the 
doctorate in law” would “be administered by a joint committee of the 
Faculties of Political Science, Philosophy, Pure Science, and Law, so as to 
maintain common standards for the two degrees.”120  The Trustees 
approved a “Doctor Juris” in 1923.121 
The Juris Doctor dramatically increased inter-disciplinary offerings 
at Columbia, as “the Faculties of Political Science, Business, and 
Philosophy,” all offered “seminars and problem courses” to doctoral 
candidates in the law school.
122
  The doctorate also increased the emphasis 
on research at the school, offering students the opportunity to complete a 
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substantive research project, or dissertation.
123
  Students who undertook to 
write a dissertation received a Master of Laws after one year of 
coursework and were then allowed to complete their dissertation in 
absentia.
124
  Thus, the law school assumed a degree structure not unlike 
the rest of the university, with a Bachelor’s for preliminary work and a 
Master’s and Doctorate for advanced, theoretical study. 
Yet, not all members of the faculty were satisfied; some arguing 
that the law school should jettison its emphasis on training practitioners 
completely and focus instead on pure research.
125
  One such professor, 
Herman Oliphant, wrote to Columbia University President Nicholas 
Murray Butler in 1923 asking him to approve “more concentrated research 
on the interrelation of law to the other social sciences – research so 
concentrated that it ought to be the sole concern of the School, to the 
exclusion of everything else.”126  Butler denied the request, but the issue 
reemerged in a self-study completed in 1928 that divided the faculty.
127
  
According to Oliphant and others, the school should “abandon its 
traditional purpose of preparing students for practice” and focus instead on 
devoting itself “to critical, constructive, creative, research.”128  A 
contingent of professors lobbied for Oliphant to become dean, a move that 
met resistance from the rest of the faculty, including the university 
President.
129
  As “deadlock[]” ensued, President Butler sided against 
Oliphant and in favor of more moderate candidate Young B. Smith, 
prompting an “immediate uproar” that resulted in resignations by Oliphant 
and friends, including Leon Marshall, Underhill Moore, Hessel E. 
Yntema, and future Supreme Court Justice William O. Douglas.
130
 
Following the “secession” at Columbia, Dean Smith diffused 
remaining tensions by endorsing both academic research and practical 
preparation, augmenting traditional courses with offerings that approached 
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“the study of law in terms of underlying political, economic, and social 
factors.”131  This included retaining standard courses like Civil Procedure, 
Corporations, and Partnerships; meanwhile adding non-doctrinal courses 
on “public law, legal history, and jurisprudence.”132 The latter aimed at 
“reevaluat[ing] legal institutions in terms of their effects, in order that the 
law might be more usefully employed, and to revise their curricula and 
methods of teaching so as to accustom lawyers to the use of knowledge 
derived from other fields of knowledge.”133 
 While such courses had long been reserved for upper level study, 
specifically the Master’s and Doctorate degrees, now they emerged in the 
required three year curriculum.  Yet, the case method remained dominant.  
Even faculty with inter-disciplinary interests like Karl Llewellyn extolled 
it, as he made clear during his introductory “Bramble Bush” lectures to 
1Ls in 1929.
134
  During those talks, Llewellyn stressed the value of the 
training that the students were about to receive.  “We have discovered,” he 
began, “that students who come eager to learn the rules, and who do learn 
them, and who learn nothing more, will take away the shell and not the 
substance” of legal education.135  That substance, he continued, came in 
part from the study of cases, precisely because they demonstrated how 
“general proposition[s]” were best illustrated by focusing on “concrete 
instances,” of how general principles applied to specific circumstances.136 
Simply imparting general principles, argued Llewellyn, 
“hinder[ed]” rather than “help[ed]” instruction because the practice of law 
focused less on imparting rules than resolving “disputes.”137  Such 
disputes were relevant to attorneys precisely because their “oldest job” 
was to serve as “advocate[s,] for clients, both by counseling them and 
lobbying on their behalf in court.
138
  “Lawyers are lawyers because they 
alone among men devote themselves with some constancy to studying out 
what courts are going to do,” he argued.139  What courts did played 
directly into the identification and comprehension of legal rules.  Once 
students had deciphered the language of each case, maintained Llewellyn, 
then they were to identify the dispute in question, remembering that courts 
only decide a “particular dispute” “according to a general rule.”140  At the 
“kernel” of each opinion, he continued lay the “rule of the case.”141  
Hence, by reading through a series of cases students not only came to 
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learn the general rule, but how that rule applied in different contexts.  
Further, students learned to decipher which facts were relevant and which 
were irrelevant to comprehending rules, a process arrived at through a 
series of questions.
142
  Once students identified the relevant facts, they 
then moved to the rule of the case, and were subsequently pushed to 
compare that case to others.  To Llewellyn, the comparing of more than 
one case “brings us at last,” he noted, “to the case system.”143  Simply 
reading one case on a legal topic, he argued, was futile, for “no case can 
have a meaning by itself.”144  “Standing alone,” he maintained, cases 
provided “no guidance” into legal rules; what gave students “sureness” 
was relating “the background” of different cases, forming the “foundation 
of the case system.”145  To Llewellyn, the case system was itself a type of 
game, a “game of matching cases,” that “proceed[ed]” by “a rough 
application of the logical method of comparison and difference.”146 
Llewellyn’s lectures revealed that the case method had done more 
than simply prepare students for practice under the Field Code; it 
demonstrated Keener’s objective of imparting a particular way of 
thinking.
147
  “From this angle, moreover,” he wrote, “you will observe 
another value in the study of the cases.
148
  Each opinion is an example of 
legal reasoning – with and from prior cases.”149  He warned against 
students going “too early to the writers” of treatises, noting that “[t]o do so 
is to come under strong temptation to skip through the process of case 
matching.”150 By matching cases, students honed their analytical skills, 
developing a more rigorous habit of reasoning than if they had simply read 
treatises outlining the general principles of law.
151
 
 Llewellyn’s exuberance over the case method underscores the 
extent to which the approach had come to dominate legal education by the 
close of the 1920s, even after scholars like Oliphant argued for a more 
contextual course of study.  As we have seen, the method’s initial adoption 
bore a distinctly practice-oriented objective, one that coincided with 
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Langdell’s own practice experience and with changes in pleading wrought 
by New York’s Field Code.152  By 1929, however, the popularity of the 
method far exceeded its relevance simply to procedural rules in New 
York.  As Columbia Law School Professor William Keener put it, the 
method developed “reasoning powers,” in part by inculcating “legal 
analysis and synthesis.”153 Future Supreme Court Justice Harlan Fiske 
Stone reiterated this point, noting that the case method ultimately helped 
elevate law schools to their “proper relation” with the American 
university, in part by instilling “a more profound knowledge of legal 
principles” that transcended technical training.154   According to historian 
Julius Goebel, “the widespread adoption of the case method” in American 
law schools led legal education to become “highly standardized” by 1920, 
based heavily on an “accepted pattern of [case] study.”155 
Yet, the case method’s ascension would face a unique challenge 
during the Great Depression, as the next section will show.  Law teachers 
at Columbia, in particular, moved to broaden legal education not simply 
by adding public law courses to the traditional curriculum, but 
transforming that curriculum itself, de-emphasizing the case method and 
including interdisciplinary components within traditional courses as early 
as the first and second year.  This move invariably exploded the tiered 
approach to legal education established by Columbia in the 1920’s, a 
fracturing brought on by slowdowns in hiring due to the Great Depression.  
As the nation sank into a decade of decline, some even blamed the case 
method for contributing to the crisis.  As we shall see, critics agreed that 
the preparation of practice-ready attorneys remained paramount, even as it 
required a more expansive, interdisciplinary curriculum.  
 
II. LLEWELLYN & THE DEPRESSION 
 
When Karl Llewellyn delivered his first Bramble Bush address to 
law students in the fall of 1929, few anticipated the economic crisis about 
to hit the nation.
156
  Even the “avalanche of liquidation” that rocked the 
stock market on Tuesday October 23
rd
 did not strike observers as the 
beginning of a decade-long crisis, some foolishly heralding the crash as a 
“long-predicted” market “correction” likely to “purge the economic 
system of unhealthy toxins.”157  Similar sentiments held through the 
following year, leading many to conclude as late as December 1930 that 
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the nation was simply “caught up in yet another of the routine business-
cycle downswings” that “periodically” affected America’s “boom-and-
bust economy.”158  Perhaps for these reasons, Karl Lewellyn expressed 
little consternation in his Bramble Bush lectures that legal education was 
either in crisis or in need of change.
159
 
By 1935, however, things had worsened.  Few could deny that the 
country was in the midst of “a colossal financial meltdown” impacting 
“not only the notoriously idle rich” but “struggling neighborhood banks, 
hard-earned retirement nest eggs, and college and university 
endowments.”160  America’s gross domestic product fell by half its 1929 
level, “millions” lost their homes, and “25 percent of the work force” 
found itself jobless.
161
 According to Columbia Law Professor Herbert 
Wechsler, the Depression “had a damned demoralizing effect” on recent 
law graduates, not least because “jobs were scarce,” but also because 
“salaries were low.”162  Even “large and well-established” firms like 
Sullivan & Cromwell, Davis Polk, and Cravath, De Gersdorff, Swaine & 
Wood posted only “rare vacancies,” pushing many to find work at “much 
smaller outfits” for “very little return.”163   
As the magnitude of the crisis became apparent, Karl Lewellyn 
revised his opinions on legal education.  In a lecture delivered at Harvard 
on January 22, 1935, he announced that legal education had become 
“blind,” “inept,” “factory-ridden,” “wasteful,” “defective,” and 
“empty.”164 Part of law school’s problem, began Llewellyn, was that it had 
lost touch with the kinds of jobs that law graduates actually acquired, 
focusing too heavily on corporate “legal factory-hand” work and not 
enough on students who went into small firms, politics, and “government 
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administration,” a “recent trend” at Columbia given the slow-down in big 
firm hiring.
165
 
If law schools did not adapt, warned Llewellyn, their “existing 
bankruptcy” would become “an open shame.”166  “Demands on us rise by 
the hour,” he lamented, “[w]e have taken coin, we have usurped status, 
under the pretense of training for the law.”167 To Llewellyn’s mind, 
European schools provided an alternate model of legal education, aspects 
of which were worth replicating in the United States.  In Germany, for 
example, students completed three years of course work only to then begin 
“a further three years of directed, rounded, apprenticeship,” funded in part 
by the government, which provided students with a “modest stipend.”168  
“What have we done,” asked Llewellyn, along similar lines?  The answer 
was nothing.  American schools “face[d] the absence of any 
apprenticeship at all,” he noted, implying that some form of law office 
training needed to be returned to the law school curriculum.
169
 
Yet, even as Llewellyn endorsed a return to practice, he by no 
means abandoned the case for academics.  In fact, he lobbied for 
something arguably new in legal education, a merger of case study with 
contextual material.  “[W]e either integrate the background of social and 
economic fact and policy,” into law school courses, argued Llewellyn, “or 
fail of our job.”170  This was new, particularly in the context of private law 
courses.  Yet, Llewellyn believed strongly that such courses warranted 
revision, and that a purely academic faculty possessed the best 
qualifications for doing so.  To his mind, academic, full time faculty 
remained the most able to provide “perspective” on the case method, 
including “social and economic fact and policy.”171  The reason for this, he 
posited, was because “legal rules” by themselves meant “next to nothing,” 
and that students needed to understand the context of such rules in order to 
effectively counsel clients.
172
  Such contingencies included an inquiry into 
sociology and political science, something that lawyers were poorly 
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equipped to provide.
173
  “[W]hen it comes to broadly social facts, in their 
social bearings, lawyers are helpless,” argued Llewellyn, “[t]hey fall for 
the tripe that journalists talk” a colorful way of saying that lawyers lacked 
critical perspective, preferring instead to “manhandle statistics” for tactical 
reasons.
174
 
Convinced of the importance of an inter-disciplinary approach, 
Llewellyn called for reform; modifying his longstanding endorsement of 
the case method with calls for new approaches to legal pedagogy; 
including an emphasis on non-traditional, inter-disciplinary material.
175
  
“The need is,” he exclaimed; “for an integration of the human and the 
artistic with the legal,” ultimately with an eye to broadening the career 
opportunities of law school graduates who may not receive jobs as “legal 
factory-hand[s]” in large corporate firms, what Llewellyn termed the 
“upper reaches of the corporation-factory.”176  The economic strain of the 
Great Depression loomed large in Llewellyn’s arguments, pushing him to 
acknowledge the need for new approaches given new market conditions, 
particularly the decline of big firm hiring and the “recent trend” of jobs in 
“government administration,” particularly Roosevelt’s New Deal.177 
 However, Llewellyn revealed some concern about mounting inter-
disciplinary, non-doctrinal courses like “Legal History, Legal Philosophy, 
and Jurisprudence.”178  Noting that earlier reformers had rushed to “pile 
on” such courses in a “fourth year” of law school, Llewellyn countered 
that three years was ample time to gain a satisfactory legal education, 
provided that professors recognized the importance “of integrating 
background – social or philosophical – into every course.”179  “[C]ritique 
is of the essence,” he maintained, “not only of understanding and reform, 
but of practice,” therefore law professors should strive to provide 
“background” material “as an inevitable part of the rule-material 
studied.”180  “The professor’s job,” concluded Llewellyn, “involves 
incorporating the “fact-background necessary to give to a policy, inquiry 
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interest; to a rule, meaningfulness; to a counseling-question, body; [and] to 
a critical evaluation, hands and feet.”181 
Llewellyn’s interest in augmenting the case method with external 
materials is worth noting.  Columbia had long mounted non-doctrinal 
courses, as we have seen.  However, such courses tended to accumulate at 
the Master’s and Doctorate level, not during the first three years.  Now, 
Llewellyn proposed that the entire curriculum assume an inter-
disciplinary, policy-centric cast; including even private law courses 
traditionally taught via the case method.   
However, in a manner that is worth noting today, Llewellyn did 
not view a more inter-disciplinary focus to be less practical.
182
  “I think the 
most lamentable thing about American legal education,” he declared 
during a talk at Duke Law School in 1936, “is it has taken into account 
neither the society in which the job must be performed nor what we are 
educating for.”183  Foremost in Llewellyn’s mind was the cost of legal 
education and the need to represent the poor, both complicated by calls for 
“standards” from practitioners and Bar Associations.184 “Who,” asked 
Llewellyn, is going to spend four years in college and three years in law 
school and five years building up a practice to go down and work for 
$5.00 or $10.00 on a case[?]”185  Legal clinics, he argued, were simply not 
well-staffed enough to address the need for “poor man’s law work,” 
particularly at a moment when over half the population found itself mired 
in poverty.
186
 
Next, Llewellyn blasted legal education for failing “to equip” 
students “for the practice of law.”187  “How is it possible,” he argued, “for 
three years’ law school and one bar examination to equip a man for the 
practice of law?”188 Not a concern during his Bramble Bush talks, 
Llewellyn suddenly seemed extremely interested in the incorporation of 
apprenticeships into the law school curriculum, perhaps because law firms 
had stopped hiring students with little or no practice experience.
189
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“Where is the apprenticeship here?” he wondered, rejecting Langdell’s 
view that law teaching should be separate from practice.
190
  “[E]very 
lawyer,” he observed, “hires a kid at a loss for the first six months at 
least,” something fewer firms proved willing to do under Depression-era 
constraints.
191
  “We need an apprenticeship again,” announced Llewellyn, 
alluding to the pre-Langdellian days of law office learning.
192
 
Even as he called for a return to antebellum apprenticeships, 
however, Llewellyn did not reject the case method.  Provided that cases 
were not over-edited, they too served a practical purpose; they were 
“concrete.”193  “Every case in an office is new,” he declared, and “[y]ou 
can help get ready for that, with your casebook.”194  However, over-edited 
casebooks were dangerous.  “Many casebooks,” posited Llewellyn, “edit 
their facts right out of the picture,” reducing their utility to “a bunch of 
judicial essays, each about nothing concrete and rather badly put 
together.”195  The end result of this trend, he announced, was that students 
did not “begin to learn law” until they were “out of law school” and, when 
they did, it was “in spite of” their teachers.196 
Midst his drubbing of legal pedagogy, Llewellyn made an odd 
claim.  “I think that one of the things that goes to make lawyers is to make 
the law a cultural study.”197  He noted that calls for “culture with a Capital 
‘C’” had existed for decades, adding worthwhile courses in “Roman Law, 
Jurisprudence, and the then still unfamiliar fields of Constitutional Law,” 
and “Administrative Law.”198  But, argued Llewellyn, law schools needed 
to do more, “to make the meaning of law to human people take on the 
same color that it has in a well-written drama, – a thing of excitement.”199 
He summarized by saying that “the best two lines” of improving legal 
education were to develop “sounder technical training” and also “the 
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development of a realistic sense on the basis of fact,” in particular the 
interaction of legal doctrine with evolving customs.
200
 
Concerned with the cost of legal education and the practicality of 
legal training, Llewellyn remained mindful that inter-disciplinary methods 
could still be relevant to preparing students for other types of work, 
particularly policy work in the New Deal.  As the private sector shrank, 
Columbia realized that one of the few areas of job growth in the country 
lay in government service, particularly as the Roosevelt Administration 
endorsed the creation of new federal agencies and, with them, new federal 
responsibilities.
201
  As Columbia Law Professor Julius Goebel noted, the 
New Deal generated a “phenomenal increase in governmental functions,” 
many of which required “competent lawyers.”202 Recognizing an 
emerging market for graduates, Columbia worked diligently to refashion 
itself as “training place for public service,” in part by emphasizing “the 
importance of integrating work in public law into the professional law 
curriculum.”203  Fueling this move, confirmed Goebel, was the “decline of 
employment by law offices” caused by the rigors of the Great 
Depression.”204  While training students for government service had once 
been a prominent goal of Professor John Burgess, its primary advocate 
during the 1930s would be a much younger professor of Criminal Law, 
Herbert Wechsler.  As the next section shall demonstrate, Wechsler joined 
an assault on the case method that would intersect in important ways with 
the decline of the LL.B. and the rise of the J.D.. 
 
V. THE CASE METHOD ON TRIAL 
 
As the nation sank into Depression, members of Columbia’s 
faculty began to call for new approaches to pedagogy, including a 
reconsideration of the role of public law in the law school curriculum.
205
  
One reason for such requests was a hope that students might gain jobs in 
federal offices involved in the New Deal, prompted by “the phenomenal 
increase in governmental functions during the early thirties” coupled with 
the “coincident decline of employment by law offices due to the rigors of 
the Great Depression.”206  Another was political.  Perhaps no faculty 
member demonstrated this more clearly than Assistant Professor Herbert 
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Wechsler.
207
  Hired in 1933 to invigorate the teaching of public law at 
Columbia, Wechsler agreed to teach Criminal Law in the first year, 
replacing the more traditional private law course in Business 
Organization.
208
  The new professor happened to believe that the Great 
Depression had been caused in part by a blind faith in the market, 
especially the dangerous endorsement of unregulated banking and an un-
policed stock exchange.
209
 Such factors contributed to the economic crisis, 
believed Wechsler, and made a mockery of the formalist premise that 
economic affairs were best managed through the private adjudication of 
legal disputes.
210
  The case method further confounded the problem, 
argued Wechsler, precisely because it perpetuated what Roscoe Pound 
called the common law’s “antipathy to legislation,” its tacit dismissal of 
state regulation as a lesser form of lawmaking than the private ordering of 
property and contract.
211
  Even as culturally-minded scholars like 
Llewellyn clung to Langdell in the midst of the howling 1930s, in other 
words, Wechsler began to view the study of cases in expressly political 
terms as limiting, even dangerous.  Not surprisingly, he turned to earlier 
thinkers who had long called for curricular reform, law teachers like Felix 
Frankfurter among them.
212
 
To Herbert Wechsler and his senior colleague Jerome Michael, 
Frankfurter provided theoretical ammunition for fighting the nation’s 
frightening plunge into economic recession, a recession accelerated by 
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doctrinal formalism.
213
  Frankfurter’s conviction that students should be 
taught that law is “an instrument” to be used for “human betterment” 
impressed them, as did Frankfurter’s support for President Franklin 
Delano Roosevelt’s New Deal.214  Both Wechsler and Michael proudly 
endorsed Roosevelt, standing out as two of only five “New Dealers” on 
Columbia’s law faculty at the time.215  When the Supreme Court began 
striking down New Deal programs like the Agricultural Adjustment 
Administration and the National Industrial Recovery Act on what they 
believed were overtly formalist, “closed system” grounds, both Wechsler 
and Michael placed at least some blame at the feet of the case method for 
producing a socially isolated, politically unresponsive judiciary.
216
  As 
Wechsler later remembered it, the Court possessed no “receptivity to 
statutory changes of the common law,” lacked any “sympathetic treatment 
of administrative agencies,” and clung desperately to the notion of the 
common law as a “closed system,” a position that deserved “unqualified 
disdain.”217 
Rather than view law as a closed system, Wechsler came to view it in 
more “utilitarian” terms, an instrument of “statecraft” that could be used to 
pull the country out of its fiscal woes.
218
  Before this could happen, 
however, lawyers and law students needed to learn to think about the law 
differently; as a tool for change and not a prophylactic to state intervention 
and control.  Wechsler distilled these notions into four separate “articles of 
faith” that guided his legal career.219  They included: 1) a rejection of the 
common law as a “closed system,” 2) an emphasis on “judicial receptivity 
to statutory changes of the common law,” 3) a presumption that “legal 
understanding is imperfectly obtained” and, 4) an “unqualified disdain” 
for the Supreme Court’s formalist destruction of New Deal programs 
“despite the magnitude of the abuse and dislocation incident to the 
development of an industrial society.”220 
Wechsler let his “articles of faith” guide his selection of materials for 
teaching criminal law.  Not offered at Columbia prior to Wechsler’s 
arrival on the faculty in 1931, criminal law had been virtually ignored due 
to the fact that it was “generally thought to have no money in it” and was 
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therefore “not interesting” to most “bread-and-butter” students.221  
Precisely for this reason, Wechsler saw teaching the course as an 
“opportunity” for him to put his philosophical and political assumptions 
into practice.
222
 
Yet, Wechsler did not stray completely from the case method.  He and 
Michael chose an arguably conservative, perhaps even subversive path to 
reform by assembling “pedagogical materials” that included traditional 
cases but also “invited cogitation outside the closed system.”223  Rather 
than debunk the casebook entirely, they modified it to introduce students 
both to case reading and to “legislative or quasi-legislative judgment,” in 
part by incorporating a variety of materials that pressed students to ponder 
“interesting questions” like: “what are the consequences of this or the 
other type of formulation or norm?” “How can we find out something 
about consequences?” And “how can we face up candidly to value 
choices?”224  Such questions, believed Wechsler, constituted a “wholly 
different way of thinking about the law” than the earlier “Langdellian 
way.”225 
Other members of the Columbia faculty also leaned towards 
incorporating new methodologies into their case method classes.  In his 
landmark 1930 casebook on Sales, for example, Karl Llewellyn declared 
openly that “an effort” had been made “to draw on suggestions from the 
other social sciences,” including “modern psychology,” “sociology,” and 
“anthropology.”226  Columbia law professor Walter Gellhorn joined 
Llewellyn, including new materials and mounting new courses in public 
and administrative law, eventually publishing an influential casebook on 
Administrative Law in 1940.
227
  Meanwhile, Herbert Wechsler and Jerome 
Michael completed the final touches on their criminal law casebook, 
publishing it in 1940.   
By the close of the 1930s, Columbia Law School had undergone a 
quiet transformation, directed by law professors committed to realigning 
legal pedagogy with New Deal politics, meanwhile preparing law students 
for new careers.  During this time, Karl Llewellyn’s enthusiasm for the 
“bramble bush” of the case method diminished, pushing him to become 
increasingly critical of legal education as the 1930s progressed.  Others 
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joined, including Llewellyn’s colleagues Herbert Wechsler and Jerome 
Michael; all assembling new casebooks with less cases and more 
secondary materials, essentially merging the study of cases with the study 
of secondary sources during the first three years.  
This was important.   Even as schools in the 1920s veered towards 
an incorporation of inter-disciplinary materials, they did so primarily in 
advanced third and fourth years, frequently with the understanding that 
inter-disciplinary work was best reserved for advanced students interested 
in pursuing optional Master’s or Doctorate degrees.  Beginning in the 
1930s, however, scholars at leading schools like Columbia began to 
incorporate secondary materials earlier.  To illustrate, one need only 
compare a section of Wechsler and Michael’s casebook on voluntary 
manslaughter with that of Joseph Henry Beale.
228
  In his 1893 text, Beale 
covered the specific offense of voluntary manslaughter by assigning eight 
cases, no comments or notes.
229
  By contrast, Wechsler assigned only one 
case.
230
  The case, Regina v. Welsh, was one that Beale had included in his 
casebook, but minus its companions; providing students with little sense 
of how cases could be synthesized, or “matched” to derive legal rules.231  
Instead, Wechsler filled the section with notes, including brief summaries 
of several cases along with North Dakota's statutory prohibition against 
infanticide, an excerpt from Bentham's “Theory of Legislation,” an 
excerpt from Holmes's “The Common Law,” and a statute from India.232 
For a new generation of law teachers, Wechsler’s method provided 
an exciting new take on the old case method.  According to Sanford 
Kadish, a World War II veteran who took Wechsler’s class and went on to 
draft one of the most widely used criminal law casebooks in the country, 
Wechsler’s approach was “intellectually exciting in a way that other 
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classes were not.”233  While other courses stressed “legal distinctions and 
legal analysis” Wechsler mounted a class that was at once “highly 
analytical and self-consciously intellectual,” pushing students to consider 
problems from a “legislative point of view.”234  
 Kadish left Wechsler’s class transformed, eventually publishing his 
own, Wechsler-inspired casebook in 1960.
235
  The book enjoyed lasting 
success, going through subsequent printings into the 21
st
 Century.
236
  
Meanwhile, Karl Llewellyn softened his attack on legal education, 
returning in the 1950s to calls for “legal scholarship” that “lay almost 
wholly outside the orbit of doctrine.”237  “[O]nce war and the teaching jam 
were over,” declared Llewellyn, “we had acquired a profession with heavy 
injections of new ideas, new personnel, new backgrounds of experience,” 
and new “hungers for facts about the life of the law, for knowledge about 
and understanding of conditions in this sport or area or in that or 
somewhere else; even – and this is the most gratifying – hungers for 
knowledge and understanding of basic processes in legal institutions.”238 If 
the Depression sparked anger at legal education’s failure to prepare 
practice-ready lawyers, in other words, the economic boom that followed 
World War II coincided with renewed interest in theoretical work.  “I 
should guess,” asserted Llewellyn in 1956, “that 1951-1960 offers 
prospect of three times as much significant research about matters legal, in 
areas other than doctrine, as got done in the whole preceding fifty 
years.”239 
 One year later, as Llewellyn settled into a new position at the 
University of Chicago Law School, he continued to exhibit enthusiasm for 
research, even criticizing law teachers who aimed to eliminate “that whole 
perspective and background of philosophy and of national and 
international governmental practice.”240  “[T[he arts of law,” continued 
Llewellyn, “are not only essential to any professional work, they are also 
law’s common ground with those humanities which are a university’s core 
and pride, and among which law should stand with the proudest.”241  
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Llewellyn’s reference to the humanities flagged a resurgent post-
Depression interest in keeping a place for law schools at the university’s 
“core,” a place otherwise dominated by departments focused heavily on 
academics and research.  To demonstrate how Chicago Law School 
warranted a seat at the university’s table, Llewellyn extolled it’s diversity 
of course offerings, including “a most interesting comparative law 
development” involving “a full year’s intensive work in a foreign legal 
system and its language … followed by a year’s locally-supervised study 
and practice in the relevant foreign country,” what Llewellyn described as 
an “ingenious device for equipping an American to do legal work across 
national and language barriers.”242  Llewellyn also celebrated Chicago’s 
course offerings in jurisprudence, particularly its “Jurisprudence Law in 
Our Society,” a course that involved “weekly papers” focused on 
“philosophies of government.”243 
 Yet, even as Llewellyn extolled scholarship, so too did he lament 
the textbook innovations of his former Columbia colleague Herbert 
Wechsler.
244
  “[N]ot too many students are fully aware,” argued 
Llewellyn, “of the ways in which today’s case-books have tended to defeat 
the finest values open to the case-method,” a not-so-subtle allusion to 
Wechsler’s reduction in the number and length of cases that students were 
required to read.
245
 Alarmed at the emerging popularity of Wechsler’s 
approach, Llewellyn urged caution.  Not only did new casebooks tend to 
over-edit cases, he argued, but their reduction in the total number of cases 
caused pedagogical problems as well.  “[T]he case loses its very 
discussion value,” argued the recently hired Chicago Professor, “if it is 
presented alone and simply to illustrate or communicate its rule, instead of 
appearing with companion cases to show development or to challenge to 
thoughtful distinction and synthesis and in either aspect to close the 
general situation in question with detail and flavor enough to turn 
student’s policy-judgment into more than a guess or a daydream.”246  
Luckily, Chicago “edited” cases “in the finest original tradition,” much 
like he did in his book on Sales, providing a much needed counterpoint to 
the emerging trend.
247
 
 Though careful not to implicate his new school, Llewellyn’s 
critique of “today’s case books” revealed the extent to which Langdell’s 
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method had begun to evolve as authors like Wechsler added new, 
secondary materials to provide inter-disciplinary perspectives.  However, 
the emergence of such perspectives in the first three years of law school 
had an unanticipated effect.  By introducing more theoretical materials to 
required courses, it diluted the notion that theoretical work should be 
reserved for optional, post-graduate degrees. Just as legal education 
became more inter-disciplinary, in other words, so too did legal reformers 
begin to call for awarding all graduates of three year law schools a 
doctorate; whether they completed independent research projects or not.   
This became particularly obvious in the 1950s and 60s, as smaller, 
regional schools clamored for greater prestige.   By 1964, for example, 
twenty seven schools had abandoned the Bachelor of Laws, or LL.B. for 
the J.D.; almost all regional institutions that enjoyed little national 
prominence.
248
  One of the foremost proponents of such a move, 
Oklahoma City School of Law Dean John G. Hervey, possessed little 
interest in scholarship or research, drawing a clear line between 
“professional doctorates” like the M.D. and D.D.S. (dentistry); and 
“research doctorates,” like the Ph.D.249  Though prominent law schools 
like Columbia, Harvard and Yale reserved the doctorate for advanced 
candidates conducting original research, Hervey viewed such accolades in 
shallower terms; arguing that awarding J.D.’s would eliminate confusion 
between the LL.B. and the Bachelors of Arts and Science, meanwhile 
“enhanc[ing] the professional stature,” of law school graduates.250 
Of course, Hervey failed to mention that just as some confused the 
LL.B. and the B.A., so too did others confuse the J.D. and the Ph.D.  No 
less than the National Education Association made such a mistake, 
conducting a study in 1960 equating the LL.B. degree with a “low level of 
preparation” in law on par with a B.A., meanwhile counting J.D.’s “as 
doctor’s degrees,” on par with the Ph.D..251  Though careful to note that 
the J.D. remained a “professional doctorate,” even Hervey maintained that 
the “level of intellectual activity” required for the J.D. placed it firmly 
within the range of a Doctorate and not a Bachelor’s or Master’s degree.   
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Time spent in school was a factor.  “A change of the education symbol to 
J.D.,” he argued, “is thus required to insure fairness to law school 
graduates who pursue three or more years of post-bachelor study.”252  
By the time Hervey put pen to paper, a number of law schools had 
already moved to the Juris Doctor.  While Hervey conceded that some 
required students to complete independent research projects before 
granting them a doctorate, most did not.  “During the academic year 1963-
64,” he noted, the J.D. degree was conferred by 27 schools,” only some of 
whom reserved it for “those who had attained a specific grade average or 
who had successfully completed a research project.”253  Rather than 
promote heightened research requirements, essentially nudging the J.D. in 
the direction of the Ph.D., Hervey called for cosmetic reform, arguing that 
a simple name-change would enhance the stature of law schools within 
larger university systems.  “The receipt of a second bachelor’s degree by 
law school graduates,” he maintained, “tends to impair the image of the 
legal profession,” meanwhile lowering “the image of the law school in the 
minds of those who instruct in the other divisions of the parent 
institution.”254   
Not everyone agreed.  According to George P. Smith, an instructor 
at the University of Michigan, law schools should strive to improve their 
core curricula if they wanted to command the respect of the larger 
academic community, not simply rename their degrees. “Although the 
‘image’ of the general profession as well as the law schools need to be 
strengthened,” conceded Smith, “the uniform awarding of the J.D. degree 
is not, at this particular time, the proper remedy to pursue.  Rather, the 
development and improvement of the standards for the work done for the 
basic law degree should be of first and primary consideration.”255  Smith 
did not elaborate on how, precisely, the mandatory curriculum should be 
improved.  However, he did seem to indicate that advanced level research 
remained better suited for advanced law degrees, either the Master of 
Laws (LL.M.) or the Doctor of Jurisprudence (S.J.D.).
256
   
Schools that awarded the S.J.D. and LL.M. tended not to support 
the J.D. movement for at least two reasons.  One, the conferral of a 
doctorate on all students who had completed three years of law school 
undermined the prestige of advanced degrees.  After all, why pursue an 
additional doctorate, much less a master’s, if one already held a doctorate 
in hand?  Two, the move to a uniform J.D. originated with inferior, 
evening law schools that did not support advanced research to begin with, 
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a fact that further rankled the “big” East Coast schools.257  At least this 
was the fear of the three schools that offered “the largest graduate 
programs” in the country, “Harvard, Yale, and Columbia,” none of whom 
were “anxious to award a ‘doctor’s degree’ before the LL.M. and 
S.J.D.”258  
Ivy League reluctance underscored Smith’s complaint that the 
“J.D. Movement” was “spearheaded” by inferior schools, institutions that 
were not “members of the [AALS] and are evening schools.”259  “Dean 
Hervey lists 27 schools,” continued Smith, “[e]ight of the twenty-seven 
schools are not members of the Association fo American Law Schools.  Of 
the four additional schools proposing (considering) the adoption, two are 
not members of the Association.  Thirteen out of the twenty-seven schools 
comprising the Hervey List are night schools, with five being solely 
evening schools and the other eight having both day and evening 
classes.”260 In a private letter to Smith, Harvard Law School Dean Erwin 
N. Griswold agreed with him, describing the “J.D. Movement” as 
“unwise, unsound, and undesirable.”261 
Sadly for Smith, elite law schools found themselves outnumbered. 
Both the American Bar Association (ABA) and the Association for 
American Law Schools (AALS) recommended in 1964 that law schools 
move to the Juris Doctorate for three years of work.
262
  One reason for this 
was to place “the graduates of law schools upon an equality” with those 
“who receive professional doctorates.”263  Another was to eliminate public 
confusion between the Bachelors of Arts and Sciences and graduate legal 
work.  To “the general public,” noted Hervey, a “bachelor’s is a bachelor’s 
is a bachelor’s.”264   
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VI. CONCLUSION: A DOCTORATE FOR ALL 
 
By the close of the 1960s, the Juris Doctor reigned ascendant over 
other law degrees, Columbia and Harvard both adopting it in 1969 and 
Yale – the final holdout – in 1971.265  Thus ended a half-century of debate 
over the appropriate law school credential, even as the role of theoretical 
work, inter-disciplinary material and pure research in the first three years 
remained unsettled.  As we have seen, early Progressive-era proponents of 
raising the academic profile of legal education lobbied for optional fourth 
and fifth years dedicated to academics and research resulting in a Masters 
and then Doctoral degree.
266
  Such a system provided a clear, logical 
delineation between minimum standards required for entrance to the bar 
and more advanced work for those interested in specialization or pure 
academics.
267
  The tier structure made further sense given that law 
students graduated with a second Bachelor’s, or LL.B. upon completing 
the first three years, a holdout from the days when students could 
matriculate without first earning a Bachelor’s of Arts or Science.268 
Karl Llewellyn’s iconic Bramble Bush lectures extolled the 
practical value of the LL.B. system as late as 1929, even as schools across 
the country tacked an extra year onto their Bachelor’s curriculum.269  
Though many students lamented the addition of a third year, Llewellyn 
embraced it, celebrating deeper immersion into legal topics, more inter-
disciplinary offerings, and a heightened profile for legal education 
generally.
270
 
Enter the Great Depression.
271
 As this Article has sought to 
demonstrate, the economic downturn of the 1930s dramatically influenced 
views of legal education, a point illustrated starkly by Karl Llewellyn 
himself.
272
  While enthusiastic about legal education in 1929, Llewellyn 
soured as the Depression dragged on.  By 1935, he complained that law 
schools were mere “assembly lines” dedicated to taking their students 
“coin” and providing them little of practical value in return.273  Llewellyn 
furthered this critique in 1936, joining a score of academics calling for 
pedagogic reform.
274
 
However, Llewellyn did not target inter-disciplinary scholarship.  
While some reformers called for an increased attention to clinical work 
and practical skills, Llewellyn joined a cadre of pro-New Deal law 
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teachers who advocated inter-disciplinary, policy-centered coursework.
275
  
For example, Llewellyn’s colleague Herbert Wechsler argued that private 
sector slowdowns could be compensated by placing students in federal 
New Deal agencies, a move that required at least some familiarity with 
inter-disciplinary, policy issues.
276
  Further, Wechsler joined other 
scholars in de-emphasizing the value of the case method, arguing that it 
contributed to over-confidence in the private sector and did not warrant its 
dominant position in legal pedagogy.
277
  To weaken the method’s hold, 
Wechsler joined his senior colleague Jerome Michael in pioneering a new 
style of casebook featuring fewer opinions and more secondary, inter-
disciplinary materials.
278
 
 As the Depression gave way to post-War prosperity, Wechsler’s 
method caught on.
279
  Even diehard proponents of the case method like 
Karl Llewellyn – who lamented the drop in assigned cases in books like 
Wechsler’s – extolled the availability of inter-disciplinary offerings in 
fields such as comparative law and Jurisprudence.
280
  That such offerings 
came in the first three years did not seem to bother anyone, even though 
they had once been reserved for optional, fourth and fifth year work.
281
 
 That inter-disciplinary work had once been tied to fourth and fifth 
year classes remains one of the most overlooked aspects of law school 
history today.  Current critics of legal education lament the fact that overly 
academic courses clutter the J.D. curriculum, forgetting that the simple 
pursuit of practical training underwent its own dark period prior to the 
Depression, as law schools strove to increase their standing among other 
university departments.
282
  Early reformers solved this challenge by 
trifurcating law degrees, leaving the LL.B. for practice-minded students 
and the more advanced Master’s and Doctorate degrees for students who 
wanted specialized, even abstract knowledge.
283
  
 However, less prestigious schools clamored for the right to confer 
a higher credential in the 1950s and 60s, disrupting the Progressive-era 
equilibrium.
284
  Just as the distinction between mandatory and optional 
work faded; so too did the J.D. movement confuse the role of pure 
research in legal pedagogy.
285
  Yet, proponents of the J.D. movement 
justified their position, in part, by citing the increasingly theoretical nature 
of the three year curriculum.
286
  Herein lies an irony that current law 
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school critics fail to appreciate.  Even as top law schools attacked the J.D. 
movement for watering down legal credentials, few proponents of that 
movement complained about theoretical work in the first three years, 
conceding that precisely such work warranted a Juris Doctor degree.
287
   
While we may wonder whether the incorporation of theoretical 
work into a three year curriculum is practically necessary, the rise of the 
Juris Doctor would arguably never have occurred had law schools simply 
aimed to train practitioners.  As we have seen, its history is closely tied to 
efforts by legal reformers to make law school the equivalent of 
comparable graduate programs, a struggle arguably dating back to the 
days of Langdell.
288
  Even John Hervey, champion of the “professional” 
doctorate, extolled the academic nature of the three year program, a 
program that did indeed become much more theoretical during the New 
Deal.
289
 
This leads to a final point.  While current arguments that law 
school is too long may warrant merit, the conferral of a Juris Doctor for 
two years of practical/clinical training may not.  Already, the legal 
doctorate lacks academic credibility compared to the Ph.D., further 
diluting its significance may only jeopardize the standing of law schools 
vis a vis other university departments, perhaps even leading universities to 
drop such schools during times of economic hardship for the putative 
reason that they lack intellectual value and/or rigor.  As a parting thought, 
it may be better to keep law schools firmly wedded to the research mission 
of universities generally, meanwhile revisiting the question of plural 
degrees, perhaps a Master’s of Law after two years work (with an option 
to then take the Bar exam), a Juris Doctor for three, and an S.J.D for more.  
As we have seen, there is not only precedent for such a move, but it enjoys 
a certain logic, perhaps one more compelling than the post-War argument 
that all lawyers deserve a J.D. simply because it sounds prestigious.
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 A. Benjamin Spencer, The Law School Critique in Historical Perspective, 69 WASH. 
& LEE L. REV. 1984 (2012).  Shaving one year off the current curriculum will leave little 
room for inter-disciplinary, policy-oriented courses, and may even change the way 
doctrinal courses are taught.  For example, two years reduces the time available to take 
bar classes, a move that they may push casebook authors and teachers to truncate their 
syllabi, and adopt more condensed teaching methods.  Precisely such methods dominated 
American law schools during the early Progressive Era, as law schools crammed multiple 
topics into a single year through BarBri style lecture.  While a return to lecture may be 
agreeable to some, important questions remain as to whether graduates of such truncated 
programs should receive a Juris Doctor degree.  For free-standing law schools with no 
university ties, the answer may be yes.  For law schools affiliated with larger, research 
universities, however, the abbreviation of legal education may warrant some 
consideration of the continued legitimacy of legal education in the eyes of universities 
generally, a dilemma that might warrant reconsideration of the plural degree. 
